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From The Final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Utah, Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki Presiding 
Defendants-appellees, pursuant to Rules 27 and 35 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, hereby submit this response to the petition for rehearing filed 
by the plaintiff-appellant with respect to the Court's opinion of April 19, 2007. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff-appellant GLFP, Ltd ("GLFP") seeks rehearing with respect to two 
issues decided by the Court, namely: 1) that the Court erred in affirming the trial 
court's ruling that GLFP's breach of fiduciary duty claim, which is based on 
allegations of fee and property mismanagement, constitutes a derivative claim as a 
matter of law (Op. at 3-5); and 2) that the Court erred in affirming the trial court's 
discretionary ruling whereby GLFP was denied the opportunity to directly pursue 
its derivative claim under the "close corporation" exception. (Op. at 7-12). 
The Court correctly decided, as a matter of well-established law, both of the 
issues on which GLFP seeks rehearing. In fact, if the Court were to find otherwise, 
or alter its opinion on these issues as suggested by GLFP, the opinion in this case 
would stand in conflict to the opinions rendered in at least the following cases: 
Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980); Aurora Credit 
Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Dev. Inc., 970 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1998); Arndt v. First 
Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., 991 P.2d 584 (Utah 1999); Warner v. DMG Color, 
Inc., 20 P.3d 868 (Utah 2000); and Dansie v. City of Herriman, 134 P.3d 1139 
(Utah 2006). 
1 
I. GLFP'S SOLE DAMAGE CLAIM FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY 
DUTY IS NECESSARILY DERIVATIVE BECAUSE IT IS BASED ON 
FEES, FUNDS OR PROPERTIES OWNED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ENTITIES. 
GLFP, on numerous occasions, has tried to characterize its breach of 
fiduciary duty claim as direct, in an effort to avoid the requirements applicable to 
the proper assertion of a derivative claim for relief. However, each time GLFP 
does so, it defines a text-book derivative claim, and then GLFP simply labels it as 
direct. GLFP has characterized its lone damage claim as follows: 
• "If GLFP's claim was only that CL Mgmt had charged CLP 
excessive fees, to the equal detriment of the Clarks/HCFP and 
Leamings/GLFP as owners of CLP, the resulting legal claims could 
be classified as derivative and belonging to CLP. But the excessive 
fees were merely a starting point, and not the lynchpin of the 
Complaint. As noted, the wrongful conduct at issue was the 
commingling and misdirection of the excessive fees by CL Mgmt for 
the benefit of other Clark entities and properties, with the result that 
GLFP received less distributions than would otherwise have been 
true, and the Clarks received a benefit that GLFP did not." (Brief 
of Appellant at 9) (Emphasis added). 
• "GLFP's claim was that the Clarks and CL Mgmt were using CL 
Mgmt funds for purposes that benefited only the Clarks, and not 
GLFP/the Learnings, i.e., that directly and uniquely harmed GLFP. 
GLFP was effectively funding - through reduced distributions -
various Clark entities managed by CL Mgmt" (Reply Brief of 
Appellant at 4) (Emphasis added). 
• "[T]he financial health of CL Properties has very little to do with this 
claim. Instead, it is the actions of the Clarks and CL Mgmt in 
denying GLFP distributions from CL Mgmt - because the Clarks are 
using CL Mgmt funds to benefit other Clark entities - that is the 
basis of GLFP's claim and special harm." (Rehr'g Pet. at 2-3). 
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These allegations, although unproven and disputed, establish that GLFP's 
damage claim is based on a pure derivative theory of recovery. Despite its 
argument to the contrary, Exhibit 2 attached to GLFP's petition for rehearing is a 
diagram of a derivative theory of recovery. According to GLFP, purportedly 
"excessive fees" were charged by the limited partnership of CL Management, and 
paid by the limited partnership of Clark Learning Properties. Then, under GLFP's 
theory, CL Management's funds were "commingled and misdirected" to benefit 
the Clarks, thereby resulting in reduced distributions to GLFP. 
This is a fair and accurate characterization of GLFP's claim, which is 
necessarily derivative as a matter of law because it starts with excessive fees paid 
by Clark Learning Properties, and ends with the misappropriation of CL 
Management's funds to support Clark only entities. Litman v. Prudential-Bache 
Properties, 611 A.2d 12, 17 (Del. Ch. 1992) ("Injuries that do not exist 
independently of the Partnership or that are not directly inflicted on the limited 
partners are derivative claims. Since plaintiffs have not complied with the 
requirements of bringing a valid derivative claim, they lack standing."). 
Any claim related to excessive fees belongs to the entity that paid those 
fees—here, the limited partnership of Clark Learning Properties. Any claim 
related to the misdirection or misappropriation of funds belongs to the entity that 
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owned those funds—here, the limited partnership of CL Management. There is 
no way around this inescapable legal conclusion. 
In light of GLFP's own characterization of its damage claim, the Court 
correctly and necessarily affirmed the trial court's derivative ruling on summary 
judgment. The Court did not base its holding on any one narrow conclusion 
regarding either Clark Learning Properties or CL Management; rather, the Court 
fully understood the claim, and properly held: "Here, GLFP's claims of fiduciary 
breach, excessive fees, commingling of fees, and mismanagement of property each 
fall squarely in the category of claims that Utah law recognizes as classically 
derivative." (Op. at 4). 
This holding is amply supported by Utah law, and thus should not be altered. 
Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, 1280 (Utah 
1998) ("Actions alleging mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duties, and 
appropriation or waste of. . . [limited partnership] opportunities or assets generally 
belong to the . . . [limited partnership], and therefore, a . . . [limited partner] must 
bring such actions on its behalf.").1 GLFP's lone damage claim for breach of 
1
 See also Richardson v. Arizona Fules Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 640 (Utah 1980) 
("Therefore, any compensatory damages which may be recovered on account of 
any breach by defendants of their fiduciary duty as directors and officers or arising 
as a result of mismanagement of the corporation by defendants belong to the 
corporation and not to the stockholders individually."); Arndt v. First Interstate 
Bank of Utah, N,A„ 991 P.2d 584, 589 (Utah 1999) ("It seems reasonable, then, to 
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fiduciary duty is founded on fees and funds paid or owned by the limited 
partnership entities of Clark Learning Properties and CL Management. As such, 
the Court properly found that claim to be derivative as a matter of law. No 
rehearing is justified or otherwise warranted on this issue. 
II. THE COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT NO EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTED THE APPLICATION OF THE CLOSE 
CORPORATION EXCEPTION. 
GLFP argues that the Court erred in affirming the trial court's ruling that no 
evidence supported the application of the "close corporation" exception. (Rehr'g 
Pet. at 3). GLFP contends that the Court's opinion "rescues" the trial court by 
inserting a rationale justifying the trial court's ruling that the trial court itself did 
not state, that rationale being that un-named third parties may be prejudiced if 
GLFP were allowed to directly pursue its derivative claim under the close 
corporation exception. GLFP charges that the Court's analysis in this regard is 
based on "rank speculation." (Id. at 4). 
infer that the same principles apply to define derivative actions in the limited 
partnership context as in the corporate."); Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 20 P.3d 
868, 872 (Utah 2000) ("Claims of mismanagement, breach of fiduciary duties, and 
appropriation or waste of corporate opportunities are claims that the corporation 
has been injured. Accordingly, the cause of action belongs to the corporation and 
shareholders may sue only on its behalf."); and Dansie v. City of Herriman, 134 
P.3d 1139, 1144 (Utah 2006) ("A shareholder does not sustain an individual injury 
[or a direct claim] because a corporate act results in disparate treatment among 
shareholders. Rather, the shareholder must examine his injury in relation to the 
corporation and demonstrate that the injury was visited upon him and not the 
corporation."). 
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This argument can be dispensed with quickly because it is premised on only 
a part of the Court's opinion. GLFP neglects to mention that the Court found that 
it was GLFP's burden to present evidence justifying the application of the close 
corporation exception: a[I]t appears that the party seeking to rely upon the close 
corporation exception has the burden to come forward with evidence negating the 
three prongs identified in section 7.01(d) of ALPs Principles of Corporate 
Governance [wherein the exception is defined]." (Op. at 11 n. 5) (Citation 
omitted). This holding is supported by existing Utah law, and the very case relied 
upon by GLFP. Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W. Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 
1273, 1281 (Utah 1998) ("[A] minority . . . shareholder may proceed directly for 
corporate wrongdoing if the shareholder can show that one of the exceptions 
applies."). 
GLFP argued in its initial appeal brief that it should not be required to bear 
the burden of proving the application of the close corporation exception. (Brief of 
Appellant at 16) ("[A] court should not place the burden on the limited partner or 
minority shareholder to prove that none of the exceptions cited in the 
PRINCIPLES apply."). GLFP lost that argument, consistent with established law. 
Once this is acknowledged, the trial court's explanation of its decision not to apply 
the close corporation exception was correct and fully explained: "Finally, although 
Plaintiff argued it should be excepted from the derivative requirement, given the 
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closely held nature of [the] corporation, the evidence in the record simply does not 
support such an exception and, further, no proper Rule 56(f) motion for 
continuance has been filed." R. at 436. It is undisputed that GLFP failed to 
satisfy this burden, and no evidence whatsoever exists in the record justifying the 
application of the close corporation exception. Thus, the Court's decision was 
correct, and no rehearing is warranted on this issue. 
Moreover, GLFP's claim of error in this regard is, in any event, legally 
flawed. The Court correctly points out that numerous parties potentially affected 
by GLFP's claims are not party to this case. According to GLFP, the Court's 
recognition of this reality was improper because no evidence—"other than rank 
speculation"—supports the suggestion that the absence of these parties may create 
inconsistent liabilities, prejudice or multiple claims. (Rehr'g Pet. at 4). 
GLFP simply misapprehends the law. Established authority does not require 
proof of actual prejudice as claimed by GLFP. The mere possibility of prejudice 
is sufficient to deny GLFP's effort to invoke the close corporation exception. 
Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 761 (Utah 1984) ("Allowing plaintiff to go 
forward individually could subject defendants to multiple liability and could 
spawn multiple litigation among the partnership, the individual partners, and 
defendants. This would be unfair to absent partners, unfair to defendants, and 
contrary to judicial economy. That is undoubtedly why Rules 17(a) and 19(a) 
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forbid such a result.") (Emphasis added); Utah R. Civ. P. 23.1 ("The derivative 
action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly 
situated in enforcing the right of the corporation.") (Emphasis added).2 
The Court properly affirmed the trial court's discretionary decision that no 
evidence in the record supported the application of the close corporation 
exception. The Court also correctly noted that numerous parties potentially 
impacted by GLFP's direct assertion of a derivative claim are absent from the 
litigation, and therefore the close corporation exception should not be invoked. 
Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah App. 1991) ("We also note 
that a party may raise the issue of failure to join an indispensable party at any time 
in the proceedings, including for the first time on appeal."). No basis exists in law 
2
 GLFP skips over entirely that the Court made several assumptions in its 
favor by even addressing its request to rely on the close corporation exception: 
"Assuming without deciding that the close corporation exception is still viable in 
Utah, and assuming without deciding that the exception does, in fact, apply in the 
context of limited partnerships, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
broad discretion in refusing to invoke it here." (Op. at 10). The reality is the close 
corporation exception is a declining doctrine at a minimum, and may no longer be 
viable at all. Dansie v. City of Herriman, 134 P.3d 1139, 1145 (Utah 2006) 
("From our vantage point eight years after . . . [recognizing the close corporation 
exception], we can see that our proclamation of a 'growing trend' in recognizing 
an exception to the derivative action rule for closely held corporations may have 
overstated matters. Some jurisdictions have rejected the closely held corporation 
exception or severely limited it."). 
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or procedure to rehear the Court's opinion affirming the trial court's discretionary 
ruling precluding GLFP's effort to invoke the close corporation exception. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, defendants-appellees request that the petition 
for rehearing be denied. * ^ f 
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HOLLINGWORJH &*fl|LLIAMS 
' / 
JtfFery S. Williams 
attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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